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WHY “OR” REALLY MEANS “OR”: IN 
DEFENSE OF THE PLAIN MEANING OF  
THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION 
REFORM ACT’S SAFE HARBOR PROVISION 
Abstract: Structural features of the class action securities litigation system 
have allowed plaintiffs’ attorneys to extort settlements from risk-averse 
corporations. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) of 
1995 attempted to address these structural failings by implementing wide-
ranging reforms. Perhaps most significantly, the PSLRA created a safe 
harbor provision to immunize the type of statements typically used as 
ammunition in these frivolous litigations—forward-looking statements. 
The plain language of the safe harbor provision renders inactionable 
statements that are not made with actual knowledge of their falsity, or are 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language. Although many courts 
have read this provision literally and thus determined that a forward-
looking statement is immunized if it meets either of these two prongs, a 
minority of courts have looked beyond the plain language and deter-
mined that a statement is only immunized if it meets both prongs of the 
provision. This Note argues that the text, legislative history, and concep-
tual framework of the safe harbor provision necessitate a literal reading of 
its text: “or” means “or.” Additionally, it counters the chief criticism of such 
an approach, specifically that a literal reading produces absurd or inter-
nally inconsistent results. 
Introduction 
 Class action securities litigation has engendered much contro-
versy.1 On the one hand, the fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys initiate law-
suits on behalf of figurehead clients with little at stake has raised the ire 
of many critics.2 These critics argue that class action securities litiga-
                                                                                                                      
1 Eliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional 
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053, 2054 (1995). 
2 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 730 (acknowledging, based on evidence presented to Congress, widespread abuses in 
private securities litigations); S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
679, 683 (same); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2054. The negative implications of this 
dynamic are best embodied by the unfortunate story of William Lerach. See William P. Bar-
rett, I Have No Clients, Forbes, Oct. 11, 1993, at 52. Lerach, a well-regarded plaintiffs’ lawyer, 
earned his living by bringing fraud actions against companies when their stock prices col-
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tions are mostly “strike suits”3 (typically alleging fraud) that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers file to coerce settlements out of innocent defendants who are 
unwilling to incur the substantial costs of litigation.4 Moreover, critics 
argue that class actions initiated and directed by plaintiffs’ lawyers who 
are largely unaccountable to their clients produce an intractable 
agency problem.5 They assert that this dynamic encourages plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to pursue settlements, even though the interests of plaintiffs 
(who, as members of a large class, often stand to gain only a fraction of 
any settlement) may dictate a different strategy.6 
 On the other hand, plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that they both per-
form a vital public service and protect blameless investors.7 They assert 
that the filing of securities class actions compliments the Security and 
Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) efforts to discourage securities fraud 
and represents the only feasible means of redress for investors injured 
by such behavior.8 Moreover, even if the occasional plaintiffs’ attorney 
does abuse the system by pursuing self-interested ends, they argue that 
                                                                                                                      
lapsed. Id. Although he supposedly represented named plaintiffs, Lerach largely operated 
independent of his clients. Id. And, because even weak lawsuits could cost corporations up-
wards of $5 million, the majority of these cases settled and Lerach, who on average collected 
a third of these settlements, developed a prosperous practice. Id. Indeed, as Lerach infa-
mously boasted at a meeting of corporate directors, “I have the greatest practice of law in the 
world. I have no clients.” Id. 
In October of 2008, however, Lerach pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to ob-
struct justice and make false statements. Lawyer Sentenced to 2 Years in Class-Action Kickback 
Scheme, Chi. Trib., Feb. 12, 2008, § 3, at 3. Authorities said that Lerach’s firm “made an 
estimated $250 million in two decades by filing legal actions on behalf of professional 
plaintiffs who received kickbacks.” Id. During this time period, Lerach’s firm “paid $11.3 
million in kickbacks to people who became plaintiffs in lawsuits targeting companies such 
as AT&T, Lucent, WorldCom, Microsoft and Prudential Insurance . . . .” Id. By allowing 
Lerach’s firm to be among the first to file a fraud action when a corporation’s stock price 
collapsed, these kickbacks secured for the firm the lucrative role of lead plaintiffs’ counsel. 
Id. As a result of his role in this scheme, Lerach was sentenced to two years in federal 
prison, two years of probation, fined $250,000, and ordered to complete 1000 hours of 
community service. Id. 
3 A “strike” suit is a frivolous lawsuit alleging violations of the federal securities laws 
that is filed by a plaintiff, often a repeat, professional plaintiff, in the hope that the corpo-
rate defendant will offer a substantial settlement to avoid the expense of a protracted liti-
gation. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4. 
4 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (asserting that class action securities litigations are 
often brought to extort settlements from faultless defendants); S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 11 
(same); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2054. 
5 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (asserting that class action lawyers often pursue self-
interested ends rather than representing their purported clients); S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 
(same); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2054–56. 
6 See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2054–56. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure9 requires courts to ap-
prove class action settlements and awards of attorneys’ fees, ensuring 
that the interests of the class members are scrupulously honored.10 
 In 1995, the 104th Congress, siding with the critics of the securities 
class action industry, attempted to implement reform by enacting the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the “PSLRA”).11 The PSLRA 
instituted, among other measures, a safe harbor for the types of state-
ments often used by plaintiffs as ammunition in these claims, specifically 
forward-looking statements.12 Not only was this safe harbor designed to 
encourage disclosure of these statements by limiting corporate liability, 
but, by establishing certain threshold requirements, it also aimed to 
provide defendants with a means of resolving meritless claims at the 
pleadings stage.13 
                                                                                                                      
9 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. In relevant part, Rule 23 provides that a court may only ap-
prove a proposed settlement if it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” that any member of 
the class “may object to the proposal,” and that the power to award “reasonable attorney’s 
fees” is held by the court. Id. 
10 Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2055. 
11 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (asserting that structural defects in the 
private securities litigation system encouraged plaintiffs to file meritless claims); S. Rep. No. 
104-98, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (same). The limited empirical 
data available seemingly confirm the existence of the structural defects that spurred Con-
gress to pass the PSLRA. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 42–43; S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 5; Janet 
Copper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. 
L. Rev. 497, 517 (1991) (finding that settlement value does not correlate with case merit). 
Conducting an indirect analysis, one study found that damages, calculated as a percentage of 
the damages claimed by the class, remained remarkably consistent across a sample of cases; 
five cases settled for between 24.5% and 27.5%, and a sixth case for 20.6% (with the variance 
of the settlement amounts of the remaining two cases explained by factors not related to case 
merit). See Alexander, supra, at 517. As such, the limited empirical data available seemingly 
confirm that plaintiffs’ attorneys were both filing securities actions and receiving settlement 
payments for reasons unrelated to the merits of the particular case. See id. 
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006). As defined by SEC Rule 175, a forward-looking 
statement is: 
(1) A statement containing a projection of revenues, income (loss), earnings 
(loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other fi-
nancial items; (2) A statement of management’s plans and objectives for fu-
ture operations; (3) A statement of future economic performance contained 
in management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of 
operations; . . . (4) Disclosed statements of the assumptions underlying or re-
lating to any of the statements described in paragraphs (c) (1), (2), or (3) of 
this section. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2008). For the purposes of this Note, unless otherwise stated, the term 
“projection” will be used interchangeably with the term “forward-looking statement.” 
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 32, 44. 
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 In particular, the safe harbor provision requires that plaintiffs es-
tablish that the challenged projection either lacked sufficient disclaim-
ers, referred to in the provision as meaningful cautionary language, or 
that the plaintiff made the projection with actual knowledge of its fal-
sity.14 Read literally, as has been the practice of the majority of the 
courts, the safe harbor provision thus operates disjunctively, immuniz-
ing forward-looking statements if the plaintiff fails to show either a lack 
of cautionary language or actual knowledge.15 A minority of courts, 
however, have seemingly disregarded the statute’s plain meaning and 
instead read the two prongs conjunctively, requiring a showing of lack 
of actual knowledge under both prongs.16 
 By limiting the reach of the safe harbor provision to projections 
that are both unknowingly false and accompanied by sufficient caution-
ary language, a countertextual reading of the provision ostensibly un-
dercuts the PSLRA’s efforts to curtail frivolous fraud claims.17 Indeed, 
under this approach, an issuer that makes extensive risk disclosures still 
must typically defend (at significant expense) against the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                      
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1). 
15 Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements: A Scorecard 
in the Courts from November 2004 through November 2006, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 54, II 
(2007); see, e.g., Miller v. Champion Enters., 346 F.3d 651, 660, 678 (6th Cir. 2003); Harris 
v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 807 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999). 
16 See, e.g., Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 72 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (holding that the two prongs must be read conjunctively); Rosen, supra note 15, at II 
(noting that several courts have ignored the literal language of the statute by applying the 
statute conjunctively). 
17 See Todd Foster et al., Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litiga-
tion: Filings Plummet, Settlements Soar 2 (2007), available at http://www.mmc.com/ 
knowledgecenter/BRO_Recent_Trends_SEC1288-final.pdf. By adding a knowledge element 
to the cautionary language prong, the minority courts not only diminish the protection of-
fered by the safe harbor but also effectively prevent claims from being resolved at the plead-
ings stage, thereby undermining one of the PSLRA’s primary means of deterring frivolous 
claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); see also Alexander, supra note 11, at 524 (asserting that 
claims containing scienter elements are ill-suited for dismissal at the pleadings stage). In-
deed, the empirical data (although an admittedly imperfect measure of the effectiveness of 
the PSLRA) suggest that filings have actually risen since the enactment of the safe harbor 
provision. See Foster et al., supra, at 2. From 1991 through 1995, the federal courts received 
an average of around 200 filings per year. See id. From 1996 through 2006, the yearly average 
of filings jumped to nearly 216. See id. This number would likely have been even higher if not 
for the significant drop-off in filings in 1996, as plaintiffs preemptively attempted to circum-
vent the PSLRA by filing in state courts (this loophole was quickly closed by an amendment 
to the PSLRA). See Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–353, 
112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2006)) (extending the PSLRA to 
the states); Foster et al., supra, at 1. Regardless of the precise number of filings, an upward 
trend is apparent and has occurred despite the curtailment efforts of the PSLRA. See Foster 
et al., supra, at 1. 
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knowledge claim, allowing plaintiffs to maintain the leverage that makes 
strike suits possible and, in turn, undermining Congress’s attempt to fix 
the class action securities litigation system.18 
 This Note argues that the provision’s text, its legislative history, 
and the conceptual framework in which it operates preclude the read-
ing embraced by the minority courts.19 Part I analyzes the early devel-
opment of the limited liability regime for false or misleading forward-
looking statements.20 This Part examines the development of the com-
mon law precursor to the safe harbor provision, the “bespeaks caution” 
doctrine, as well as the enactment of the provision itself.21 Part II then 
provides an overview of the jurisprudence of the safe harbor provi-
sion.22 In particular, this Part examines both disjunctive and conjunc-
tive treatments of the statute.23 Finally, Part III argues that the text, leg-
islative history, and conceptual framework of the provision necessitate a 
literal, disjunctive reading.24 Additionally, it counters the chief criticism 
of such an approach, namely that a literal reading produces absurd or 
internally inconsistent results.25 This Note thus concludes that the mi-
nority approach is misguided because the safe harbor provision, prop-
erly read, protects forward-looking statements when the plaintiff fails to 
establish either a lack of cautionary language or the presence of actual 
knowledge.26 
I. The Development of a Limited Liability Regime for False or 
Misleading Forward-Looking Statements 
 A forward-looking statement is, as the name suggests, any statement 
that contains projections, plans, objectives, or forecasts of any kind.27 
Until early 1973, the Securities and Exchange Commission prohibited 
corporations from including forward-looking statements in any prospec-
                                                                                                                      
18 See Alexander, supra note 11, at 524 (asserting that claims containing scienter ele-
ments are ill-suited for resolution at the pleadings stage); Rosen, supra note 15, at II (“The 
safe harbor would be illusory if issuers, notwithstanding scrupulous and detailed risk dis-
closures, still had to worry that any material divergence from projected results could nev-
ertheless draw a fraud lawsuit, since even a patently meritless case can be expensive to 
defend”). 
19 See infra notes 195–287 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 27–119 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 27–119 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 120–194 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 120–194 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 195–287 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 195–287 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 195–287 and accompanying text. 
27 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2008); supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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tus or report.28 It maintained that these projections were inherently un-
trustworthy, that unsophisticated investors needed protection, and that 
sophisticated investors could make their own projections.29 In 1973, 
however, acknowledging that projections were already widespread in the 
securities markets and were essential to the decision making of investors 
who must plan with an eye toward the future, the SEC reversed its long-
standing policy and publically endorsed the disclosure of forward-
looking statements.30 In light of the federal securities laws’ existing li-
ability standards for fraudulent statements, however, increased disclo-
sure still represented an unappealing option for most entities.31 Indeed, 
because the SEC provides redress for materially false or misleading 
statements, making an inherently inaccurate projection substantially 
increases a corporation’s exposure to liability.32 To address this tension, 
                                                                                                                      
28 See Disclosures of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5362, Exchange Act Release No. 9984, 1 SEC Docket 11 (Feb. 2, 1973) [hereinaf-
ter Commission on Projections]. The SEC asserted that it has been its “long standing pol-
icy generally not to permit projections to be included in prospectuses and reports filed 
with the Commission.” Id. The SEC concluded, however, that “changes in its present poli-
cies with regard to use of projections would assist in the protection of investors and would 
be in the public interest.” Id. 
29 See Veronica H. Montagna, Comment, The First Prong of the Safe Harbor Provision of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Can It Still Provide Shelter from the Storm in the Wake of 
Asher v. Baxter International, Inc.?, 58 Rutgers L. Rev. 511, 518 n.43 (2006). See generally 
William K. Sjostrom, Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 
639 (2009) (discussing the SEC’s treatment of sophisticated investors). 
30 See Commission on Projections, supra note 28, at 2. 
31 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). SEC Rule 10b-5, the principle means of redress for 
false or misleading statements, states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Id. In addition to Rule 10b-5, federal law provides other avenues for challenging an alleg-
edly false or misleading statement, most notably SEC Rule 14a-9, which operates similarly 
to Rule 10b-5 when the misleading statement appears in a proxy statement. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-9 (2010) (prohibiting false or misleading statements or omissions in proxy solici-
tations). 
32 See Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, Exchange Act 
Release No. 15944, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810 ( July 2, 1979) (recognizing the need for a safe har-
bor provision to shield the disclosure of forward-looking information from the applicable 
liability provisions of the federal securities laws). 
2010] Safe Harbor Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1215 
the SEC in 1979 adopted Rule 175, which, in certain circumstances, 
immunizes projections from the applicable liability provisions of federal 
securities laws.33 This was the first of many changes; the liability regime 
for forward-looking statements underwent significant additional modi-
fications, first with the courts’ creation of the “bespeaks caution” doc-
trine, and, more recently, with Congress’s enactment of a statutory safe 
harbor for certain forward-looking statements.34 
 This Part discusses the emergence of the limited liability regime 
for inaccurate forward-looking statements, which effectively originated 
with courts’ articulation of the “bespeaks caution” doctrine.35 This Part 
then considers courts’ elucidation of the doctrine as a means of render-
ing a misleading forward-looking statement immaterial.36 Finally, this 
Part examines the PSLRA’s creation of a safe harbor provision for cer-
tain forward-looking statements, a development that substantially modi-
fied and obfuscated the existing limited liability regime.37 
A. The Evolution of the “Bespeaks Caution” Doctrine 
1. The Uncertain Role of Cautionary Language 
 The phrase “bespeaks caution” was first articulated in Polin v. Con-
ductron Corp., a 1977 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit.38 In Polin, a shareholder brought a 10b-5 action, alleg-
ing that Conductron’s 1967 Annual Report constituted fraud.39 The 
company had stated that it “expected” to show improvement and saw 
the “possibility” of breaking even, but ultimately failed to meet these 
                                                                                                                      
33 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2008). Rule 175, promulgated by the SEC in 1979, provided 
safe harbor for certain forward-looking statements made with a “reasonable basis” and in 
“good faith.” Id. Because Rule 175’s “safe harbor has not provided companies meaningful 
protection from litigation” and has been rendered largely moot by subsequent efforts to 
limit corporate liability, this Note does not conduct a detailed examination of the rule. See 
S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 16 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (discussing the 
shortcomings of Rule 175). 
34 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 753 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006)) (creating the statutory safe harbor); 
see also, e.g., Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 n.28 (8th Cir. 1977) (articulating 
the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, a judicially created safe harbor). 
35 See infra notes 38–66 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 67–89 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 90–119 and accompanying text. 
38 552 F.2d at 806 n.28. 
39 Id. at 806. A Rule 10b-5 action is the principle means of redress for false or mislead-
ing statements in the securities context. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). For the full text of 
Rule 10b-5, see supra note 31. 
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projections.40 The court held, however, that “[t]he terms thus em-
ployed bespeak caution in outlook and fall far short of the assurances 
required for a finding of falsity and fraud.”41 The court noted that 
“[l]anguage of expectation, of anticipation, and of possibilities recog-
nizes the imponderable influences of complex variables in a fast-
changing field.”42 Because the cautionary language was sufficient to 
prevent reasonable investors from relying on the projections, the court 
determined that the disclaimers were sufficient to render the projec-
tions inactionable.43 
 Subsequent to Polin, the federal courts did not again employ the 
“bespeaks caution” doctrine until the case of Luce v. Edelstein, decided in 
1986 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.44 In Luce, the 
court used the language coined in Polin to reject the plaintiffs’ claims 
under Rule 10b-5.45 The plaintiffs in Luce alleged that the Offering 
Memorandum of the partnership, which had been created to construct 
and sell condominium units, contained false statements about the part-
nership’s potential cash flow and tax benefits.46 The court determined, 
however, that the Offering Memorandum properly disclaimed “that its 
                                                                                                                      
40 Polin, 552 F.2d at 806 n.28. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. Although integral to a proper understanding of the liability regime for for-
ward-looking statements, the effect of cautionary language on a projection has received 
only cursory and often inconsistent treatment by the courts. Compare In re Donald J. Trump 
Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371–72 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that cautionary lan-
guage renders false projections immaterial), with I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. v. Oppen-
heimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 762–63 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that cautionary language prevents 
false projections from misleading investors). Some courts have asserted that cautionary lan-
guage renders false projections immaterial by encouraging investors to shape their actions 
based on the contingencies described in the cautionary language (the materiality-driven 
approach). See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371–72. Under this approach, cautionary language is only 
sufficient if it is substantive and tailored to the specific projection challenged by the plain-
tiff. See id. at 372. Other courts have reasoned that cautionary language renders false pro-
jections “not misleading” by preventing investors from drawing any incorrect inference 
from the projection (the falsity-driven approach). See Oppenheimer, 936 F.2d at 762–63. Un-
der this approach, cautionary language is sufficient if it prevents the reasonable investor 
from drawing any incorrect inference. See id.; Hugh C. Beck, The Substantive Limits of Liabil-
ity for Inaccurate Predictions, 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 161, 201 (2007). 
In Polin, the court implicitly adopted a materiality-driven approach. See 552 F.2d at 806 
n.28. Courts that subsequently applied the doctrine articulated in Polin would, for the most 
part, adopt a similar implicit treatment of cautionary language, with some courts seem-
ingly favoring materiality and others falsity. See Oppenheimer, 936 F.2d at 762–63 (falsity); 
Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 (1st Cir. 1991) (materiality). 
44 See 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 52–53. 
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projections of potential cash and tax benefits were necessarily specula-
tive in nature and that no assurance could be given that these projec-
tions would be realized.”47 Moreover, it “warned prospective investors 
that actual results may vary from the predictions and these variations 
may be material.”48 On these facts, the court asserted that it was not in-
clined to impose liability for statements that clearly bespoke caution.49 
As in Polin, the “bespeaks caution” doctrine articulated in Luce thus 
stood for the proposition that cautionary language is sufficient when it 
prevents reasonable investors from relying on an inaccurate projec-
tion.50 
 After Luce, the “bespeaks caution” doctrine was not employed 
again until 1991 when several circuit courts relied on either Polin or 
Luce or both in holding that false or misleading projections did not 
necessarily result in liability.51 In 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit employed the “bespeaks caution” doctrine in Romani v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, a case in which the plaintiff alleged that a lim-
ited partnership formed for horse breeding investments committed 
fraud in violation of Rule 10b-5 by inducing investments through false 
statements about the partnership’s financial potential.52 The plaintiffs 
in Romani alleged that the statements were not assurances of guaran-
teed results, but, instead, implicit (and misleading) representations that 
the operating conditions on which the partnership’s past performance 
occurred would continue.53 The court determined, however, that the 
partnership’s offering materials contained numerous statements dis-
closing the unpredictability of the horse breeding business and stating 
that the partnership’s investment objectives could not be guaranteed.54 
Because “the documents unquestionably warned potential investors in 
a meaningful way that economic conditions in the horsebreeding in-
dustry were uncertain,” the court held that the statements “clearly be-
spoke caution.”55 Thus, as in Polin and Luce, the court determined that 
the cautionary language, by warning investors not to rely on the projec-
                                                                                                                      
47 Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
48 Id. (internal quotation marks and alternations omitted). 
49 Id. (citing Polin, 552 F.2d at 806 n.28). 
50 See Luce, 802 F.2d at 56; Polin, 552 F.2d at 806 n.28. 
51 Beck, supra note 43, at 178. 
52 929 F.2d at 876. 
53 See id. at 879. 
54 Id. 
55 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tions, was sufficient to render the allegedly misleading projections inac-
tionable.56 
 In another 1991 decision, I. Meyer Pincus & Associates v. Oppenheimer 
& Co., the Second Circuit undertook a similar analysis.57 In Oppen-
heimer, the plaintiffs, investors in a closed-end investment company, 
brought a Rule 10b-5 action against the fund for alleged misrepresenta-
tions in the fund’s prospectus.58 Contrary to the implicit reasoning of 
the earlier doctrine cases, the Oppenheimer court reasoned that action-
ability depends on whether the defendants’ projections, in light of the 
cautionary language accompanying them, would have misled the rea-
sonable investor.59 The court determined that, given the ample disclo-
sures about the possibility of fund shares trading at a discount, no rea-
sonable investor would have been misled into believing that the 
prospectus predicted the success of its shares in the secondary mar-
ket.60 The court thus concluded that “[t]he statements contained 
within the prospectus clearly bespeak caution” because they prevented 
the projections from misleading the reasonable investor.61 
 The emergent case law thus evinced a subtle split between the 
courts as to the proper role of cautionary language in the “bespeaks 
caution” doctrine.62 Because the fraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws, contained in Rule 10b-5, require both a showing of materiality 
and a showing of falsity, cautionary language, to be sufficient, must ne-
gate one of those elements.63 The early doctrine cases, however, to the 
                                                                                                                      
56 See id. 
57 See 936 F.2d at 762–63. 
58 Id. at 760. 
59 See id. at 761. 
60 See id. at 763. 
61 Id. (quoting language from Luce, 802 F.2d at 56, and Polin, 52 F.2d at 806 n.28). 
62 Compare Oppenheimer, 936 F.2d at 761 (holding that cautionary language prevents 
false projections from misleading reasonable investors), with Polin, 552 F.2d at 806 n.28 
(implicitly reasoning that cautionary language renders inaccurate projections immaterial 
by preventing investors from considering the projection important in making a decision). 
63 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). Because both materiality and falsity are required to 
establish a claim under any of the fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, the two 
approaches to cautionary language, materiality-driven and falsity-driven, only differ in the 
priority accorded these elements. See Beck, supra note 43, at 182. Under a materiality-
driven approach, the materiality inquiry precedes the falsity inquiry. See id. Only if inves-
tors demonstrate that cautionary language was insufficient to prevent them from relying 
on a projection will a court consider whether the projection was false. See id. In contrast, 
under a falsity-driven approach, the falsity inquiry precedes the materiality inquiry. See id. 
Only if investors demonstrate that cautionary language was insufficient to prevent them 
from drawing an incorrect inference from a projection will the court consider whether the 
investors actually relied on the projection. See id. 
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extent that they considered the mechanics of cautionary language, 
reached contradictory conclusions.64 Although many cases, such as 
Polin, implicitly held that cautionary language rendered inaccurate pro-
jections immaterial, other cases, such as Oppenherimer, reasoned that 
cautionary language effectively prevented these projections from being 
false.65 Thus, as the “bespeaks caution” doctrine approached the fif-
teenth anniversary of its creation, the question as to whether the doc-
trine reflected a materiality or falsity framework remained open.66 
2. The Explication of a Materiality Framework 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in TSC Industries v. North-
way, Inc. did not specifically address securities fraud but nonetheless 
represented the Court’s first attempt to establish a uniform standard of 
materiality for securities litigation.67 Guided by a desire to promote 
fairness and encourage disclosures, the Court held that a fact is mate-
rial if there is a substantial possibility that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider the fact important in deciding how to vote.68 Subse-
quently, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, decided in 1988, the Court explicitly 
adopted the TSC materiality standard in securities fraud actions.69 
 Although TSC and Basic articulated a materiality standard for secu-
rities litigation, including fraud actions, neither case specifically dis-
cussed the proper materiality standard for forward-looking statements.70 
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, decided by the Court in 1991, closed 
the gap.71 In Virginia Bankshares, the Court asserted that cautionary lan-
                                                                                                                      
64 See Oppenheimer, 936 F.2d at 761; Polin, 552 F.2d at 806 n.28. 
65 See Oppenheimer, 936 F.2d at 761; Polin, 552 F.2d at 806 n.28. 
66 See Oppenheimer, 936 F.2d at 761; Romani, 929 F.2d at 879; Luce, 802 F.2d at 56; Polin, 
552 F.2d at 806 n.28. Operating within a materiality framework, cautionary statements 
render a projection inactionable (immaterial) when they are substantive and tailored to 
the specific projection challenged by the plaintiff. See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371–72. In contrast, 
operating within a falsity framework, cautionary statements render projections inaction-
able (not false) when plaintiffs fail to show “that a reasonable investor would have drawn 
important incorrect inferences from the publication of the prediction despite the disclo-
sures in the accompanying statements.” Beck, supra note 43, at 200. 
67 See 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). TSC involved the use of an allegedly misleading proxy 
statement in violation of the SEC’s proxy rules. Id. at 441. 
68 See id. at 448–49. 
69 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (“We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries standard of 
materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.”) (footnote omitted). 
70 See id. at 228; TSC, 426 U.S. at 441–42. 
71 See 501 U.S. 1083, 1094, 1097–98 (1991). Although the Court did not expressly iden-
tify the challenged statements as projections, it recognized that the statements were at least 
partially forward-looking. Id. at 1094 (“In this case, whether $42 was ‘high,’ and the pro-
posal ‘fair’ to the minority shareholders, depended on whether provable facts about the 
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guage renders an allegedly false or misleading projection immaterial 
when it prevents the projection from influencing the reasonable inves-
tor.72 There, the directors of a bank had solicited proxies for approval of 
the bank’s planned merger.73 Subsequently, a minority shareholder 
brought suit alleging that the proxy statement’s assertion that the direc-
tors had approved the merger plan because it provided “high” value and 
“fair” terms was materially misleading.74 The Court determined, how-
ever, that misleading statements accompanied by truthful cautionary 
language are rendered immaterial when the inconsistency between the 
deceptive statement and the accurate complimentary language would 
exhaust the misleading conclusion’s capacity to influence the reason-
able shareholder.75 Thus, a forward-looking statement is considered 
immaterial when its accompanying language prevents the reasonable 
investor from relying on the allegedly misleading statement.76 
 Working from this understanding of materiality, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a seminal decision in 1993, In re Don-
ald J. Trump Securities Litigation–Taj Mahal Litigation, addressed whether 
the “bespeaks caution” doctrine reflected a materiality or falsity frame-
work by expressly articulating the implicit materiality analysis that un-
dergirded the early “bespeaks caution” cases.77 In Trump, bondholders 
in a casino acquisition and construction project sued the partnership 
that issued the bonds, alleging that the representations in the prospec-
tus on the partnership’s ability to repay the bonds amounted to fraud.78 
Citing Polin and Romani, the Third Circuit noted that a number of fed-
eral appeals courts had determined that cautionary language renders 
alleged misrepresentations or omissions immaterial.79 To be sufficient, 
                                                                                                                      
Bank’s assets, and about actual and potential levels of operation, substantiated a value that 
was above, below, or more or less at the $42 figure . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
72 Id. at 1097–98. 
73 Id. at 1088. 
74 Id. 
75 See id. at 1097–98. 
76 See id. 
77 See 7 F.3d 357 at 371. As referenced below in Part II.B, commentator Hugh Beck as-
serts that Trump represents a “heretofore unacknowledged, doctrinal shift . . . [by holding] 
that accompanying statements appropriately tailored to a prediction render the prediction 
immaterial.” Beck, supra note 43, at 163. This assertion, however, rests on the disputable 
assumption that all pre-1993 “bespeaks caution” case law implicitly rejected such an ap-
proach. See id. In part, this Note disputes the assertion that Trump represented such a doc-
trinal shift. See infra notes 232–240 and accompanying text. 
78 Trump, 7 F.3d at 364–65. 
79 Id. at 371. In supporting this assertion, the court also cited Oppenheimer; because Op-
penheimer clearly adopted a falsity-based approach, however, this reliance is likely mis-
 
2010] Safe Harbor Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1221 
the court held, cautionary language must be more than mere boiler-
plate; the language must be both “substantive and tailored” to the spe-
cific projections challenged.80 Because the cautionary language in the 
prospectus not only conveyed the riskiness of the investment but also 
directly addressed the statements challenged, the court held that the 
projections at issue were immaterial and thus inactionable.81 
 The Trump court thus indicated that earlier “bespeaks caution” 
decisions were conducting an implicit materiality analysis by finding 
inaccurate forward-looking statements inactionable under the fraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws.82 In explicating this underlying 
materiality framework, Trump relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ar-
ticulation of a materiality standard for securities fraud cases.83 Although 
the Supreme Court’s materiality standard largely postdated the early 
“bespeaks caution” cases, it arose from the same conventional test of 
materiality that previously informed the emergent “bespeaks caution” 
doctrine.84 As a result, the materiality standard that Trump saw to be 
underlying the early “bespeaks caution” cases and the standard articu-
lated by the Supreme Court required the same basic inquiry: whether a 
false or misleading projection had the ability to impact the decision-
making process of the reasonable investor.85 By expressly incorporating 
the Court’s materiality analysis into the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, 
the Trump decision held that cautionary language prevents the reason-
able investor from relying on false or misleading projections and thus 
renders those projections immaterial.86 
 Although one commentator has asserted that the Trump court mis-
read precedent in articulating a materiality framework, most courts to 
employ the “bespeaks caution” doctrine after Trump have adopted this 
                                                                                                                      
guided. See id.; Oppenheimer, 936 F.2d at 761 (following a falsity-based approach that proves 
incompatiable with the Trump court’s materiality-based interepration). 
80 Trump, 7 F.3d at 371–72. 
81 See id. at 373. 
82 See id. at 371. 
83 Id. at 369 (citing TSC, 426 U.S. at 448–50). 
84 See TSC, 426 U.S. at 445 & n.8 (adopting the conventional tort test of materiality—
whether a reasonable person would attach importance to the misrepresented fact in de-
termining a course of action—that had been widely recited in various areas of the securi-
ties laws); Trump, 7 F.3d at 371 (stating that the early “bespeaks caution” cases implicitly 
adopted a materiality-based approach). 
85 See TSC, 426 U.S. at 449; Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. 
86 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 369, 371. 
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understanding.87 Thus, even if the early “bespeaks caution” decisions 
did not reflect an implicit materiality analysis, the Trump court suc-
ceeded in establishing a lasting precedent that firmly implanted this 
analysis in the doctrine.88 As such, post-1993, the “bespeaks caution” 
doctrine stood for the proposition that cautionary language renders 
inaccurate projections inactionable by negating the materiality (not the 
falsity) of a false or misleading projection.89 
B. A Statutory Limit to Liability: The PSLRA’s Safe Harbor Provision 
 In 1995, the 104th session of Congress determined that legislation 
was necessary to further insulate defendants from unwarranted liabil-
ity.90 After hearing substantial testimony, Congress concluded that class 
action securities litigations were often filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys for 
manipulative and extortionate purposes.91 Particularly, Congress found 
that many of these litigations constituted strike suits that were filed af-
ter a collapse in a company’s stock price by plaintiffs’ attorneys aiming 
to extract settlements from risk-averse defendants.92 Indeed, the evi-
dence reviewed by Congress established that certain attorneys targeted 
deep-pocketed defendants without consideration of actual culpability.93 
These plaintiffs’ lawyers not only used the discovery process to leverage 
settlements out of faultless defendants, but also regularly manipulated 
their clients to secure lucrative fee payments.94 Despite the egregious-
ness of this behavior, Congress observed that, absent truly outrageous 
conduct, federal judges were largely unwilling to utilize Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to sanction offending plaintiffs.95 
 Congress thus concluded that the unchecked filing of frivolous 
securities suits significantly and detrimentally impacted not only the 
nation’s capital markets and corporations, but the investing public as 
                                                                                                                      
87 See Beck, supra note 43, at 163; see also, e.g., Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 
F.3d 399, 400 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that cautionary language renders predictive state-
ments immaterial); Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167 & n.24 (5th Cir. 1994) (same). 
88 See Saltzberg, 45 F.3d at 400; Rubenstein, 20 F.3d at 167 & n.24; Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. 
89 See, e.g., Saltzberg, 45 F.3d at 400; Rubenstein, 20 F.3d at 167 & n.24; Trump, 7 F.3d at 
371. 
90 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 730; S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683. 
91 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31; S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4. 
92 H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31; S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4. 
93 H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31. 
94 Id. 
95 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31. 
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well.96 The negative economic impact of these suits was most glaring.97 
By imposing unnecessary litigation and, often times, settlement ex-
penses on faultless parties, these suits increased the cost of raising capi-
tal.98 Moreover, by threatening to expose the defendant company and 
its directors to substantial (and often unwarranted) liability, these suits 
also deterred the most qualified candidates from serving on corporate 
boards and effectively chilled disclosures of predictive information.99 
Indeed, when frivolous litigation compels companies or their insurers 
to pay attorneys’ fees, incur settlement expenses, and generally waste 
management resources, investors are ultimately the ones forced to suf-
fer the decrease in economic efficiency.100 
 Accordingly, Congress determined that procedural protections 
were needed to safeguard against the threat of such litigation.101 The 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was thus enacted on December 
22, 1995.102 The purpose of the legislation was threefold: “(1) to en-
courage the voluntary disclosure of information by corporate issuers; 
(2) to empower investors so that they—not their lawyers—exercise pri-
mary control over private securities litigation; and (3) to encourage 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to pursue valid claims and defendants to fight abusive 
claims.”103 To encourage disclosure, the PSLRA instituted a safe-harbor 
provision that immunizes, in certain circumstances, false or misleading 
forward-looking statements.104 To empower investors, the PSLRA cre-
                                                                                                                      
96 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 32; S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4. 
97 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31–32; S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4. 
98 See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4. 
99 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31–32, 38. 
100 Id. at 32. 
101 Id. 
102 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Following debate on the floor, 
the Senate passed the bill 65 votes to 30; the House, with 320 representatives voting for 
and 102 voting against, subsequently passed the bill with a veto-proof majority. Alfred 
Wang, Comment, The Problem of Meaningful Cautionary Language: Safe Harbor Protection in 
Securities Class Action Suits After Asher v. Baxter, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1907, 1917–18 (2006). 
The bill was then sent to President Clinton, who, on December 19, with less than an hour 
to go before the bill automatically became law, exercised his veto power. Id. at 1917. The 
President’s veto, however, was promptly overridden with the House and Senate voting to 
override, 319 to 100 and 68 to 30, respectively. Id. at 1918. The PSLRA thus became law on 
December 22, 1995. Id. 
103 See S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 4. 
104 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006); S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 5. As enacted, the safe 
harbor provides that a defendant shall not be liable with respect to any forward-looking 
statement to the extent that: 
(A) The forward-looking statement is—(i) identified as a forward-looking 
statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identify-
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ated a presumption that investors with the largest financial interest 
would serve as the lead plaintiff, required more transparency in settle-
ment agreements, and precluded certain abusive practices (such as 
plaintiffs receiving bounty payments for participation in the suit).105 Fi-
nally, to encourage valid claims and deter abusive ones, the PSLRA also 
adopted a modified proportionate liability standard for less culpable 
defendants, heightened the pleading standard for bringing a securities 
fraud claim, and required courts to make findings regarding the com-
pliance of all participating attorneys with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.106 
 Amidst these sweeping reforms, the safe harbor provision stood 
out as the cornerstone of the PSLRA.107 It provides three avenues 
through which a defendant can immunize an allegedly false or mislead-
ing projection.108 First, under subsection (A), the safe harbor inoculates 
all projections that are identified as forward-looking and accompanied 
by meaningful cautionary statements that identify important factors 
that could cause actual results to differ materially from those pro-
jected.109 This same subsection also removes from the purview of the 
federal securities laws any forward-looking statements deemed immate-
rial.110 In addition, under subsection (B), the safe harbor provision in-
                                                                                                                      
ing important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from 
those in the forward-looking statement; or (ii) immaterial; or (B) the plaintiff 
fails to prove that the forward-looking statement—(i) if made by a natural 
person, was made with actual knowledge by that person that the statement 
was false or misleading; or (ii) if made by a business entity; was—(I) made by 
or with the approval of an executive officer of that entity; and (II) made or 
approved by such officer with actual knowledge by that officer that the state-
ment was false or misleading. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (footnote omitted). 
105 See S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 6. 
106 See id. at 7; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
107 See Ann Morales Olazábal, Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements Under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: What’s Safe and What’s Not?, 105 Dick. L. Rev. 1, 4 
(2000) (noting that the safe harbor is the PSLRA’s “most significant substantive compo-
nent”). 
108 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1). For the full text of PSLRA’s safe harbor provision, see 
supra note 104. 
109 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A). 
110 Id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(ii). This provision primarily encompasses statements that con-
stitute puffery, which has been defined by the courts as “vague and general statements of 
optimism.” See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1428 n.14 (3d Cir. 
1997). Because statements of puffery are understood by reasonable investors as such, in-
vestors do not rely on them and they are therefore immaterial. See id. Although determina-
tions of materiality are typically left to the trier of fact, securities fraud claims often contain 
misrepresentations that are so obviously unimportant that courts can rule them immaterial 
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oculates any forward-looking statements that the plaintiff fails to prove 
were made by the issuer with actual knowledge of their falsity.111 Thus, a 
literal reading of the safe harbor provision immunizes defendants if, 
under the first prong, they accompany the forward-looking language 
with “meaningful cautionary statements” or if, under the third prong, 
they make the statements without “actual knowledge” of their falsity.112 
 The congressional record indicates that the safe harbor provision 
of the PSLRA was built on the foundations of the two earlier attempts 
to limit liability for inaccurate projections, namely the courts’ “bespeaks 
caution” doctrine and the SEC’s Rule 175.113 Although Congress found 
that the “bespeaks caution” doctrine and Rule 175 did not adequately 
deter frivolous litigation, it nevertheless incorporated elements of both 
these earlier approaches in drafting the PSLRA.114 Although Congress 
utilized only Rule 175’s definition of forward-looking statements, the 
“bespeaks caution” doctrine played a much more substantive role in 
Congress’s construction of the new statutory safe harbor.115 The Senate 
Report’s articulation of the “bespeaks caution” doctrine extensively 
quoted language from the Third Circuit’s materiality-driven decision in 
Trump.116 Indeed, in quoting from Trump, the Report focused on lan-
guage that formally explicated a materiality-driven approach to the “be-
                                                                                                                      
as a matter of law at the pleading stage (thus furthering the PSLRA’s policy of forestalling 
manipulative fraud litigations). See Payne v. DeLuca, 433 F. Supp. 2d 547, 561 (W.D. Pa. 
2006). 
111 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B). Although the provision contains only two main subsec-
tions, (A) and (B), a statement receives the protection of the safe harbor in three different 
situations: when the statement is identified as forward-looking and accompanied with 
meaningful cautionary language, when the statement is immaterial, and when the defen-
dant makes the statement without knowledge of its falsity. Id. § 78u-5(c)(1). Accordingly, in 
referencing the meaningful cautionary language and actual knowledge prongs of the pro-
vision, this Note will refer to the former as the first prong and the latter as the third prong. 
See id. The second prong, (A)(ii), is beyond the scope of this Note as the materiality-
framework implicated in this Note focuses on the impact of cautionary language on the 
materiality of a projection, not on the facial materiality of a projection. See id. § 78u-
5(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
112 See id. § 78u-5(c)(1). As this Note discusses in Part II, there is considerable dis-
agreement as to whether the courts should read the safe harbor literally and thus apply the 
provision disjunctively or, instead, adopt a conjunctive understanding of the statute. See 
infra notes 120–194 and accompanying text. 
113 See H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 730; S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 16–17 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683. 
114 See H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 43. 
115 See S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 17; 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(c) (2008). 
116 S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 16–17. 
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speaks caution” doctrine.117 As this reliance on Trump indicates, Con-
gress, in constructing the safe harbor, envisioned cautionary language 
as capable of rendering inaccurate projections immaterial.118 Although 
the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision evinces neither an adoption nor a 
complete supplanting of the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, the congres-
sional record makes clear that this materiality-based conception of cau-
tionary language was one of the elements of the doctrine that was in-
corporated into the statutory safe harbor.119 
II. Judicial Interpretations of the PSLRA’s Safe  
Harbor Provision 
 When Congress passed the PSLRA on December 22, 1995, the 
meaning and impact of the safe harbor provision were largely unclear.120 
As one commentator observed, “Congress [had] simply left too many 
ambiguous gaps and statutory hiatuses for the Reform Act’s impact to 
be reliably assessed . . . .”121 Chief among these uncertainties was the in-
terpretation of the statute’s safe harbor provision—specifically, the 
proper definition of meaningful cautionary language.122 A clear split 
subsequently emerged between the federal circuit courts of appeals over 
precisely this issue.123 The majority of circuit courts, reading the cau-
tionary language prong as sufficient to immunize any projection ac-
companied by adequate disclaimers, have interpreted the safe harbor to 
protect statements when either the first or third prongs are satisfied (re-
                                                                                                                      
117 See id. (“‘In other words, cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omis-
sions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law.’”). 
118 See id. 
119 See id. Although the congressional record suggests that that safe harbor provision 
was not intended to be coterminous with the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, several courts 
have determined that the former codified the latter. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 
82 F.3d 1194, 1213 n.23 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the “bespeaks caution” doctrine was 
codified in the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision); In re Copper Mountain Sec. Litig., 311 F. 
Supp. 2d 857, 881–82 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (same). 
120 John C. Coffee, The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat 
Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. Law. 975, 975 (1996) (asserting that the PSLRA is not a fait 
accompli, but that it “is more like wet clay that has been shaped into an approximation of 
a human form by an apprentice craftsmen and has now been turned over to the master 
sculptor for the details that will spell the difference between high art and merely compe-
tent mediocrity”). 
121 Id. 
122 See id. at 989–90. 
123 See Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 72 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(acknowledging that the circuits had split on the proper definition of meaningful caution-
ary language). 
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ferred to hereinafter as a “disjunctive reading”).124 At the same time, 
however, a significant number of circuits have reasoned that cautionary 
language attached to a knowingly false projection is typically not mean-
ingful, and have thus held that a projection must satisfy both the first 
and third prongs of the safe harbor provision to receive its protection (a 
“conjunctive reading”).125 With these divergent interpretations arising 
from courts’ (often implicit) utilization of distinct conceptual frame-
works, the circuit split arises from a fundamental disagreement as to the 
proper conceptual home for cautionary language.126 
 This Part reviews the jurisprudence relating to the PSLRA’s safe 
harbor provision.127 Section A examines a number of decisions that 
have interpreted the provision disjunctively.128 Section B then analyzes 
several conjunctive interpretations of the provision.129 
A. Disjunctive Interpretations of the PSLRA’s Safe Harbor Provision 
 A literal reading of the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision suggests a 
disjunctive interpretation, as the statute ostensibly immunizes a defen-
dant’s forward-looking statements if they meet either the first prong’s 
meaningful cautionary statement requirement or the third prong’s ac-
tual knowledge requirement.130 As such, a disjunctive reading suggests 
that the defendant’s state of mind is not relevant to a first prong analy-
sis.131 This interpretation, which conceptualizes cautionary language as 
a means of notifying investors of the risks attendant to the projection, is 
firmly rooted in the materiality framework.132 The majority of the fed-
                                                                                                                      
124 See, e.g., Miller v. Champion Enters., 346 F.3d 651, 660, 678 (6th Cir. 2003); Harris v. 
Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 807 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999). 
125 See, e.g., Baron v. Smith, 380 F.3d 49, 55 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004); No. 84 Employer-
Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 936 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
126 See Harris, 182 F.3d at 807 n.10 (adopting a materiality-based approach and a dis-
junctive reading); Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (adopting a falsity-based approach and a 
conjunctive reading). 
127 See infra notes 130–194 and accompanying text. 
128 See infra notes 130–155 and accompanying text. 
129 See infra notes 156–194 and accompanying text. 
130 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006); Steven J. Spencer, Comment, Has Congress Learned 
Its Lesson? A Plain Meaning Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 71 St. 
John’s L. Rev. 99, 118 (1997) (noting that, under a plain meaning approach, “[e]ven delib-
erate omission of one or more important factors appears not to subject the issuer to private 
liability, since some important factors would still be identified, just not all of them”). 
131 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); Spencer, supra note 130, at 118. 
132 See Harris, 182 F.3d at 807 (stating that cautionary language is sufficient when an 
investor is “warned of risks of a significance similar to that actually realized, [so that] she is 
sufficiently on notice of the danger of the investment to make an intelligent decision 
 
1228 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1209 
eral circuits to consider this issue have elected to adopt this literal read-
ing and have thus determined that either a presence of cautionary lan-
guage or a lack of actual knowledge immunizes a false or misleading 
projection.133 
 In July of 1999, Harris v. Ivax Corp., decided by the U.S Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, was the first circuit court-level opinion 
to squarely address the first prong of the PSLRA’s safe harbor provi-
sion.134 In Harris, investors filed a Rule 10b-5 fraud action against Ivax 
and a number of its officers.135 The plaintiffs alleged that certain press 
releases failed to mention the possibility of a goodwill write-down that 
would result in a $104 million loss in the third quarter of 1996.136 The 
plaintiffs contended that the optimistic outlook in Ivax’s press releases 
concealed its intention to write down goodwill and that the lists of po-
tential risk factors contained within the releases failed to include the 
possibility of such a write-down.137 
 The court first examined the statements in the press releases and 
determined that each statement fell squarely within one of the defined 
categories of forward-looking statements.138 The court thus concluded 
that the statements potentially qualified for safe harbor protection.139 
The court then considered the cautionary language that accompanied 
the forward-looking statements and determined that it was indeed suf-
ficient to grant the statements the protection of the safe harbor.140 
 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ con-
tention that the language was merely boilerplate.141 The court instead 
reasoned that the warning that Ivax appended to the press releases was 
detailed and informative: it told the investor what kind of hardships 
                                                                                                                      
about it according to her own preferences for risk and reward.”); In re XM Satellite Radio 
Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 185, 186 n.14 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding, in lan-
guage mirroring the materiality standard articulated in In re Trump Securities Litigation-Taj 
Mahal Litigation, 7 F.3d 357 (1993), that cautionary language is sufficient when it provides 
“‘substantive information about factors that realistically could cause results to differ mate-
rially from those projected in the forward-looking statement’”). 
133 See Rosen, supra note 15, at II. 
134 See 182 F.3d at 807. 
135 Id. at 802. 
136 Id. Goodwill refers to “[a] business’s reputation, patronage, and other intangible 
assets that are considered when appraising the business, [especially] for purchase; the 
ability to earn income in excess of the income that would be expected from the business 
viewed as a mere collection of assets.” Black’s Law Dictionary 763 (9th ed. 2009). 
137 See Harris, 182 F.3d at 804. 
138 See id. at 804–07. 
139 Id. at 807. 
140 Id. at 803. 
141 Id. at 807. 
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could befall the company and what their effect could be.142 Further, the 
court determined that the absence of the factor that ultimately made 
the forward-looking statement inaccurate—the failure to disclose the 
possibility of a goodwill write-down—was not dispositive of the suffi-
ciency of the cautionary language.143 The court held that, to put an in-
vestor on notice of the risk of an investment, the statute only required 
the warning to mention important factors that could cause actual re-
sults to differ from those predicted, not to list all such factors.144 Thus, 
in articulating its understanding of cautionary language, the court rec-
ognized that the purpose of such language is to render false or mislead-
ing projections immaterial (as opposed to not misleading).145 
 The plaintiffs argued, however, that the defendants’ knowledge of 
the need to write down goodwill stripped the projections of their for-
ward-looking status.146 The court rejected this argument as entirely un-
persuasive; it reasoned that a defendant’s state of mind is only relevant 
to liability, and then only when the cautionary language is insufficient.147 
Indeed, the court reasoned that when a forward-looking statement is 
accompanied by sufficient cautionary language, a defendant’s knowl-
edge of a projection’s false or misleading nature is irrelevant to the 
court’s safe harbor analysis.148 In sum, the court determined that when 
investors have been warned of risks similar to those actually realized, 
they are sufficiently on notice of the danger of the investment to make 
an informed decision in accordance with their own preferences for 
risk.149 Thus, according to the court, when cautionary language is suffi-
cient to render a projection immaterial, the defendant’s state of mind is 
irrelevant.150 
 A majority of the federal circuits have either explicitly or implicitly 
adopted the Harris court’s literal reading and, in turn, its disjunctive 
interpretation of the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision.151 For instance, in 
                                                                                                                      
142 Id. 
143 See Harris, 182 F.3d at 807. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. (“In short, when an investor has been warned of risks of a significance similar 
to that actually realized, she is sufficiently on notice of the danger of the investment to 
make an intelligent decision about it according to her own preferences for risk and re-
ward.”). 
146 Id. at 808 n.10. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 803. 
149 See Harris, 182 F.3d at 807. 
150 Id. at 803. 
151 See Rosen, supra note 15, at II. U.S. district courts within the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have read the safe harbor provision literally, extend-
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2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Miller v. Cham-
pion Enterprises expressly cited Harris in determining that the projections 
at issue, which were accompanied by sufficient cautionary language, 
qualified for safe harbor protection under the PSLRA.152 In articulating 
its understanding of cautionary language, the court asserted that issuers 
must only disclose the general nature of the risk and need not “detail 
every facet or extent of that risk,” recognizing, as did the court in Harris, 
that cautionary language serves to render projections immaterial.153 Be-
cause the court determined that the contested forward-looking state-
ments contained such cautionary language, it concluded that “[n]o in-
vestigation of defendant’s state of mind [was] required.”154 The Miller 
court’s reliance on the Harris precedent represents the typical treatment 
of the safe harbor provision by federal courts.155 
B. Conjunctive Interpretations of the PSLRA’s Safe Harbor Provision 
 Although a majority of the circuits have adopted a literal interpre-
tation of the safe harbor and have accordingly read the statute disjunc-
tively, a substantial minority of circuits have read the first prong’s mean-
ingful cautionary language requirement and the third prong’s actual 
knowledge requirement conjunctively.156 Proponents of such an ap-
proach generally assert that a defendant’s actual knowledge of the false 
or misleading nature of a forward-looking statement prevents that de-
                                                                                                                      
ing protection to statements that either contain cautionary language or lack evidence of 
knowing falsity. Id. 
152 Miller, 346 F.3d at 678. 
153 See id. Indeed, this language effectively precludes a falsity-driven approach to cau-
tionary language because, to be sufficient under such an approach, cautionary language 
must prevent the reasonable investor from drawing important incorrect inferences. See 
Beck, supra note 43, at 200. 
154 Miller, 346 F.3d at 678. 
155 See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 371 (5th Cir. 
2004) (“The safe harbor has two independent prongs: one focusing on the defendant’s cau-
tionary statements and the other on the defendant’s state of mind.”); XM Satellite Radio, 479 
F. Supp. 2d at 186 n.14 (“The provision is worded disjunctively: the forward-looking state-
ment must either be accompanied by meaningful cautionary language, or plaintiffs must fail 
to prove that it was made with actual knowledge of its falsity.”); In re Splash Tech. Holdings, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“[T]he court already has ruled, 
that the two prongs of the safe harbor are ‘alternative means by which forward-looking 
statements may qualify for the safe harbor . . . .’”). 
156 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (holding that the two prongs must be read con-
junctively); Rosen, supra note 15, at II (noting that several courts have ignored the literal 
language of the statute by applying the statute conjunctively). 
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fendant from satisfying the first prong of the safe harbor.157 That is, 
courts adopting a conjunctive reading argue that cautionary language 
cannot be meaningful if the actual factor that the defendant knew 
would cause the projection to be false or misleading was not explicitly 
included in the cautionary language.158 This interpretation, which as-
serts that cautionary language is insufficient if it fails to prevent an in-
vestor from drawing an incorrect inference, is firmly rooted in the fal-
sity framework.159 A significant number of courts in various districts 
have adopted this reading and have thus held that the safe harbor pro-
vision only immunizes a defendant if the defendant accompanies a pro-
jection with sufficient cautionary language and does not make the pro-
jection with actual knowledge of its false or misleading nature.160 
 For instance, in 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. America 
West Holding Corp. reasoned that a defendant may be found liable, despite 
the presence of cautionary language, if the plaintiff establishes that the 
defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of the projection.161 Al-
though the court’s determination that the challenged statements did not 
qualify as forward-looking suggests that this pronouncement amounts to 
dicta, this fact does not detract from the court’s reasoning.162 
 Indeed, a number of district courts have independently reached 
similar conclusions.163 In In re Nash Finch Co. Securities Litigation, for in-
stance, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota found that 
                                                                                                                      
157 See, e.g., Baron, 380 F.3d at 55 n.3; America West, 320 F.3d at 937 n.15; Schaffer v. 
Evolving Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998). 
158 See Baron, 380 F.3d at 55 n.3; America West, 320 F.3d at 937 n.15; Schaffer, 29 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1224. 
159 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (quoting Beck, supra note 43, at 200) (“‘Under 
this interpretation, to demonstrate that a prediction falls outside the protection of the 
meaningful cautionary statements safe harbor provision a plaintiff must show that a rea-
sonable investor would have drawn important incorrect inferences from the publication of 
the prediction despite the disclosures in the accompanying statements.’”). The courts typi-
cally neglect to explain why they have chosen to adopt a seemingly countertextual reading. 
See America West, 320 F.3d at 937 n.15 (holding without further explanation that, although 
the statements were not forward-looking, even if they were, “it is arguable that a strong 
inference of actual knowledge has been raised, thus, excepting these statements from the 
safe harbor rule altogether”); Schaffer, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (holding, without citing any 
support, that “Plaintiffs correctly argue that the safe harbor provision provides no refuge 
for Defendants who make statements with ‘actual knowledge’ of their falsity”). 
160 See Baron, 380 F.3d at 55 n.3; America West, 320 F.3d at 937 n.15; Schaffer, 29 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1224. 
161 320 F.3d at 936. 
162 See id. at 936– 37(citing only the PSLRA). 
163 See, e.g., In re Nash Finch Co. Sec. Litig., 502 F. Supp. 2d 861, 873 (D. Minn. 2007); 
Schaffer, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. 
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the contested statements were both forward-looking and accompanied 
by sufficient cautionary language.164 Nevertheless, the court held that 
the projections were not immunized by the PSLRA’s safe harbor, as 
“cautionary language can not be ‘meaningful’ when defendants know 
that the potential risks they have identified have in fact already oc-
curred, and that the positive statements they are making are false.”165 
 In contrast to these cursory treatments of the issue, Freeland v. Irid-
ium World Communications, decided in 2008 by the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia, provided perhaps the most nuanced and 
comprehensive articulation of a conjunctive approach to the safe har-
bor provision.166 In Freeland, plaintiffs, holders of various securities of 
the corporate defendant, alleged that a number of statements made by 
the defendant during the class period violated the federal securities 
laws, particularly SEC Rule 10b-5.167 Plaintiffs claimed that defendant’s 
projections were not only false, but were made with actual knowledge 
of their falsity.168 The defendant moved for summary judgment, argu-
ing that the safe harbor’s “use of the disjunctive ‘or’ between subsec-
tions (A)(i), (A)(ii) and (B)(i) means that ‘actual knowledge’ of a 
statement’s falsity is immaterial as long as that statement is identified as 
‘forward looking’” and accompanied by meaningful cautionary lan-
guage.169 The defendant supported this conclusion by highlighting the 
fact that a majority of the circuits had determined that a defendant’s 
state of mind is irrelevant to a determination of the meaningfulness of 
cautionary language.170 
 Although conceding that some courts, including another court in 
the same federal district, had articulated a disjunctive understanding of 
the statute, the court noted that neither the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme Court had directly ruled on the 
issue.171 Absent such precedent, the court concluded that the safe har-
bor provision did not necessarily protect statements that were know-
ingly false at the time they were made.172 
  Drawing from an article written by Hugh C. Beck, the court sug-
gested that a proper interpretation of the safe harbor should meet 
                                                                                                                      
164 Nash, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 873. 
165 Id. 
166 See 545 F. Supp. 2d at 71–74. 
167 Id. at 63–65. 
168 See id. at 67–68. 
169 Id. at 71. 
170 See id. at 72. 
171 Id. 
172 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 72. 
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three criteria: “‘(1) each provision should protect some set of forward-
looking statements that the other two provisions does not . . . ; (2) the 
provisions should provide acceptable guidance to managers; and (3) 
the interpretations ought to be reasonable constructions of the statu-
tory language.’”173 These criteria of construction, the court found, pre-
vent cautionary language from immunizing all defendants who disclose 
knowingly false or misleading forward-looking information.174 
 According to the Beck article, from which the court’s decision 
drew heavily, the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Donald J. Trump Securi-
ties Litigation-Taj Mahal Litigation, discussed in Part I above, represented 
a significant doctrinal shift in “bespeaks caution” doctrine case law.175 
Beck asserted that the pre-Trump “bespeaks caution” case law stood for 
the proposition that cautionary language was meaningful if it pre-
vented an investor from drawing important incorrect inferences from a 
projection.176 Conversely, Trump and its progeny asserted that caution-
ary language is meaningful if it renders a projection immaterial by pre-
venting investors from inappropriately relying on the projection.177 
 The D.C. district court then applied Beck’s criteria of construction 
to the materiality framework explicated in the Trump decision.178 Oper-
ating within this materiality framework, the court found that the statute 
satisfied the first of Beck’s criteria.179 It reasoned that the “meaningful 
cautionary statements” prong of the safe harbor would not render the 
“actual knowledge” prong superfluous because a materiality-based in-
terpretation protects knowingly false projections as long as they are ac-
companied by appropriately tailored cautionary language.180 The court 
found, however, that such an interpretation of the safe harbor provi-
sion would unavoidably fail the second two criteria of construction.181 
The materiality framework fails the guidance criterion by allowing 
managers to make knowingly false disclosures fearlessly as long as they 
provide cautionary language tailored to the subject matter of the pro-
                                                                                                                      
173 Id. (quoting Beck, supra note 43, at 199). 
174 Id. at 73. 
175 Beck, supra note 43, at 163; see supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text. 
176 Beck, supra note 43, at 182. 
177 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73; see also Beck, supra note 43, at 194–95 Although 
Beck supports the falsity-driven approach, he recognizes the existence of the distinct mate-
riality-based approach explicated in Trump. See Beck, supra note 43, at 194–95. 
178 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73. 
179 See id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
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jection.182 Moreover, this framework also fails the third criterion be-
cause a reasonable construction of “meaningful cautionary statements” 
does not allow disclosures that tailor to a specific projection but fail to 
disclose factors that management knows will cause that projection to 
prove false or misleading.183 Accordingly, the court asserted that the 
materiality framework did not provide a satisfactory interpretation of 
the statutory language.184 
 In contrast, the court determined that the falsity framework (which 
it found characterized the pre-Trump cases) allowed for a reasonable 
interpretation of the statutory safe harbor.185 Under this framework, 
cautionary language renders a projection inactionable when it prevents 
the reasonable investor from drawing important, incorrect inferences 
from its publication.186 This approach satisfies the first criterion because 
a projection made with actual knowledge of its falsity that would not 
cause a reasonable investor to draw important incorrect references 
would be immunized by the first prong while falling outside of the pur-
view of the third prong.187 Moreover, the falsity framework avoids the 
incentive-to-lie problem that prevents the materiality framework from 
satisfying Beck’s remaining two criteria of construction.188 That is, be-
cause the same evidence that demonstrates that a defendant had actual 
knowledge of a projection’s falsity will also likely demonstrate that the 
cautionary language is not meaningful, managers do not have impunity 
to make false projections.189 A falsity-based approach thus provides 
managers with adequate guidance and suggests a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the statutory language.190 As such, the court found that the falsity 
framework provided a more satisfactory interpretation of the safe har-
bor than did the materiality-based interpretation.191 
 Applying this analysis to the facts of Freeland, the D.C. district court 
declined to grant the defendant summary judgment.192 The court 
found that the plaintiffs had provided enough evidence to allow a trier 
of fact to find both that the defendant made the projections with actual 
                                                                                                                      
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73. 
185 See id. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. at 73–74 
190 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73. 
191 See id. 
192 Id. at 74. 
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knowledge of their falsity and that reasonable investors could have 
drawn important, incorrect inferences from the defendant’s disclo-
sures.193 By recognizing that the falsity-driven approach to cautionary 
language demands a conjunctive reading of the safe harbor provision, 
the court not only found the defendants’ disclosures to be inadequate, 
but, perhaps more importantly, it explicitly articulated a conceptual 
home for a conjunctive reading of the safe harbor provision.194 
III. The Case for a Disjunctive Reading of the  
Safe Harbor Provision 
 As the case law suggests, two possible interpretations of the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor provision exist.195 Equally clear, however, is the 
need for a reading of this provision to adequately reflect the safe har-
bor’s text and provide a reasonable construction of its language.196 As 
an initial matter, the materiality framework, which, according to the 
congressional record, informs the safe harbor provision, comports well 
with the plain meaning of the provision.197 It does so by allowing the 
two prongs of the safe harbor to act as independent, alternative means 
of immunizing a forward-looking statement.198 The text of the safe har-
bor provision, as well as its legislative history, affirms this disjunctive 
reading.199 Moreover, despite the “license to lie” that purportedly re-
sults from a materiality-driven interpretation, reading the safe harbor in 
this light both accords with the policies undergirding the PSLRA and 
effectively disincentivizes the disclosure of false or misleading projec-
tions.200 Thus, taken together, these factors support the conclusion that 
                                                                                                                      
193 See id. 
194 See id. at 73–74. Because a conjunctive reading strays from a literal reading of the 
safe harbor provision, the reasoning in Freeland helps justify this countertextual approach. 
See id. For the full text of the safe harbor provision, see supra note 104. 
195 See Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 74 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(conjunctive interpretation of the safe harbor); Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 807 & 
n.10 (11th Cir. 1999) (disjunctive interpretation of the safe harbor). 
196 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006). 
197 See id. § 78u-5(c)(1) (articulating the two prongs disjunctively); Harris, 182 F.3d at 
807–08 n.10 (adopting a materiality-based approach and a disjunctive reading); S. Rep. 
No. 104–98, at 16–17 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (referencing In re 
Donald J. Trump Securities Litigation-Taj Mahal Litigation, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), the Third 
Circuit’s seminal materiality-driven decision, in constructing the safe harbor provision). 
198 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); Harris, 182 F.3d at 807 & n.10. 
199 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 44 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), re-
printed in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (“The second prong of the safe harbor provides an 
alternative analysis.”) (emphasis added). 
200 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371; H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 32. Because, under a materiality-
based approach, sufficient cautionary language renders false projections immaterial by 
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the safe harbor provision, properly interpreted, immunizes forward-
looking statements either when they are accompanied by cautionary 
language or when an issuer makes such statements without actual 
knowledge of their falsity.201 
 This Part argues that the safe harbor provision demands disjunc-
tive treatment.202 Section A begins by establishing that the safe harbor 
operates within a materiality framework, and that, thus viewed, its two 
prongs must act as alternative means of immunizing a forward-looking 
statement.203 Section B then contends that the plain language of the 
provision, as well as its legislative history, supports a disjunctive read-
ing.204 Finally, Section C concludes by addressing the primary criticism 
of a disjunctive approach, namely that it produces absurd or internally 
inconsistent results.205 
A. The Safe Harbor Provision Operates Within a Materiality Framework 
 At the outset, an inquiry into the conceptual framework of the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor provision is necessary because the framework 
adopted can prove determinative of the actionability of a false or mis-
leading projection.206 Indeed, just as a materiality-based approach com-
ports better with a disjunctive reading of the safe harbor provision, a 
falsity-based approach comports better with a conjunctive interpreta-
tion.207 
 These two mutually exclusive paths—materiality and falsity— 
emerge because materiality and falsity are basic elements in any affirma-
tive fraud action in the securities context. 208 As such, the immunizing 
                                                                                                                      
preventing the projections from affecting the “total mix” of information provided to inves-
tors, any knowingly false statement that actually does impact investors will fall outside the 
safe harbor. Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. 
201 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); Harris, 182 F.3d at 807 & n.10; H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, 
at 32, 44. 
202 See infra notes 206–287 and accompanying text. 
203 See infra notes 206–243 and accompanying text. 
204 See infra notes 244–271 and accompanying text. 
205 See infra notes 272–287 and accompanying text. 
206 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (noting that the defendant’s materiality-based 
approach would produce a different outcome than the court’s falsity-based approach). 
207 See Harris, 182 F.3d at 807 & n.10 (adopting a materiality-based approach and read-
ing the safe harbor provision disjunctively); Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (adopting a 
falsity-based approach and reading the provision conjunctively). 
208 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010); see also Beck, supra note 43, at 166 n.13. Beck notes 
that falsity and materiality together represent the initial threshold of proof that a plaintiff 
must meet to recover under any of the federal antifraud provisions. Beck, supra note 43, at 
166 n.13. SEC Rule 10b-5, which often serves as an avenue for fraud claims, requires a 
plaintiff to prove scienter, reliance, and causation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; Beck, supra note 
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effect of the safe harbor provision is, as a theoretical matter, necessarily 
premised on the negation of one of these two distinct elements.209 If the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor provision is seen as operating within a falsity 
framework, cautionary language is deemed meaningful if it prevents a 
reasonable investor from drawing important, incorrect inferences from 
the publication of a forward-looking statement.210 That is, under a fal-
sity-based approach, cautionary language effectively makes a projection 
“not misleading.”211 In contrast, if the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision is 
viewed as operating within a materiality framework, cautionary language 
is meaningful if it prevents a reasonable investor from unduly relying on 
an uncertain projection.212 Under this approach, cautionary language 
thus immunizes a projection by rendering it immaterial.213 
  Determining which conceptual approach properly informs the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor provision proves significant in interpreting the 
provision itself.214 Specifically, the framework in which the cautionary 
language prong operates shapes the definition of meaningful caution-
ary language and the role of such language in immunizing projec-
tions.215 To be meaningful under a falsity-based approach, cautionary 
language must meet a relatively demanding standard: it must prevent a 
reasonable investor from drawing any important, incorrect inference 
from the inaccurate projection.216 In contrast, under a materiality-based 
approach, cautionary language is meaningful if it is substantive and tai-
lored to the specific projection challenged by the plaintiff (because 
                                                                                                                      
43, at 166 n.13. Rule 10b-5’s requirement of scienter distinguishes it from the antifraud 
provisions of the Securities Act, under which a plaintiff may recover by proving lesser de-
grees of culpability. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (requiring that a plaintiff only show 
that the defendant failed to undertake a reasonable investigation of the truthfulness of a 
misstatement); see Beck, supra note 43, at 166 n.13. 
209 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also Beck, supra note 43, at 166 n.13. 
210 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73 
211 See id. 
212 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. 
213 Id. 
214 Compare Harris, 182 F.3d at 807 & n.10 (stating that, under a materiality-based ap-
proach, the cautionary language inquiry is independent from the actual knowledge in-
quiry), with Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73, 74 (stating that, under a falsity-based approach, 
the determination of whether certain disclosures constitute meaningful cautionary lan-
guage requires consideration of the issuer’s state of mind). 
215 Compare Harris, 182 F.3d at 807 (holding that, under a materiality-based approach, 
cautionary language is sufficient if it allows the reasonable investor to make an intelligent 
decision about an investment by providing the investor with notice of its danger), with 
Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (holding that, under a falsity-based approach, cautionary 
language is only sufficient if it prevents a reasonable investor from drawing important, 
incorrect inferences from the publication of the false forward-looking statement). 
216 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73. 
1238 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1209 
such disclaimers render projections immaterial by foreclosing reason-
able reliance).217 
 The fact that the congressional record explicitly articulates a mate-
riality-driven approach suggests that Congress, in constructing the safe 
harbor provision from the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, intended to 
incorporate this approach into the provision itself.218 In fact, the record 
quotes extensively from Trump, the seminal materiality-based deci-
sion.219 
 Even absent the congressional record, however, the text of the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor provision, read literally, better comports with a 
materiality-driven approach.220 Indeed, although most courts have con-
ducted only a cursory analysis of the mechanics of cautionary language, 
the falsity-driven approach, articulated by Beck and officially adopted 
by the Freeland court, runs afoul of the plain language of the safe har-
bor provision.221 
 The disjunctive “or” that separates the two prongs of the provision 
indicates that the cautionary language and actual knowledge prongs act 
as independent, alternative means of immunizing a projection.222 For 
courts adopting a conjunctive reading, however, a lack of actual knowl-
edge is typically required for a projection to receive the protection of 
the safe harbor provision.223 
 In addition to undermining both the legislative intent and the text 
of the safe harbor provision, the falsity framework proves unsound as a 
theoretical matter.224 As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, a 
statement of beliefs (here, a projection) is factual in two senses: as a 
statement that the speaker actually holds the belief stated and as a 
statement about the subject matter of that belief.225 Because any projec-
                                                                                                                      
217 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. 
218 See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 17 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (quot-
ing Trump, 7 F.3d at 371) (“‘[C]autionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omis-
sions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law.’”). 
219 Id. 
220 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006) (establishing the cautionary language and actual 
knowledge prongs as independent, alternative means of immunizing a projection). 
221 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73; Beck, supra note 43, at 202 (articulating the fal-
sity-driven approach). 
222 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (separating the two prongs with an “or”); Harris, 182 
F.3d at 803 (stating that the defendant’s knowledge of the falsity of a projection is only 
relevant if the projection is not accompanied with meaningful cautionary language). 
223 See, e.g., Baron v. Smith, 380 F.3d 49, 55 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004); Schaffer v. Evolving Sys., 
Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998). 
224 See infra notes 225–231 and accompanying text. 
225 See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092 (1991). Beck recog-
nizes this problem and attempts to address it by asserting that the Virginia Bankshares Court 
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tion that is made with actual knowledge of its falsity invites an investor 
to incorrectly infer that the issuer actually held the belief stated, such 
projections, under a falsity-based approach, invariably fail both the first 
prong (because investors could have reasonably inferred that the issuer 
held the belief stated) and the third prong (because the projection was 
made with actual knowledge of its falsity) of the safe harbor provi-
sion.226 As such, when a projection is knowingly false, the falsity-based 
approach effectively undermines the disjunctive nature of the safe har-
bor provision by preventing the prongs from acting as independent 
means of immunizing a projection.227 
 The materiality-based approach avoids this interpretive problem.228 
Under such an approach, cautionary language is meaningful if it is sub-
stantive and tailored to the specific projection challenged by the plain-
tiff.229 Even if an issuer knew a projection was false, the projection 
would still receive protection if it were accompanied by substantive and 
tailored cautionary language.230 The materiality framework thus main-
tains the disjunctive nature of the safe harbor by ensuring that either 
the presence of cautionary language or the lack of actual knowledge 
will immunize a challenged projection.231 
                                                                                                                      
refused to rest liability solely on the inference that the speaker actually held the beliefs 
stated. Beck, supra note 43, at 202. There is no reason, however, for this limitation to be 
incorporated into the falsity-based approach. See Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1096. The 
limitation articulated by the Court in Virginia Bankshares only prevents plaintiffs from bas-
ing a securities fraud claim solely on the incorrect inference that the speaker actually held 
the beliefs stated. See id. It does not, however, prevent a plaintiff from relying on such an 
inference simply to establish that the cautionary language was insufficient. See id. Because 
a knowingly false projection is necessarily inaccurate, evidence of the issuer’s disbelief in 
these situations will presumably be used to attack the sufficiency of the cautionary lan-
guage, not to discredit the projection’s accuracy. See id. Accordingly, under a falsity-based 
approach, when an issuer makes a knowingly false projection, the safe harbor provision 
will be completely unavailable. See id. This unworkable result arises because the plaintiff 
could have reasonably believed that the defendant did hold the belief stated, thus failing 
both the cautionary language prong (because of this reasonable, incorrect inference) and, 
of course, the actual knowledge prong. See id.; Beck, supra note 43, at 202. 
226 See Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1093; Beck, supra note 43, at 202. 
227 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (adopting a falsity-based approach and a conjunc-
tive reading). 
228 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. 
229 See id. 
230 See Harris, 182 F.3d at 803; Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. Although at least one commentator 
has argued that a materiality-driven approach to cautionary language provides issuers with 
a license to lie, this criticism both overlooks the policy concerns underlying the PSLRA 
and overstates the dispensation actually granted to issuers. See Beck, supra note 43, at 200 
(arguing that a materiality-driven approach results in a license to lie); see also infra notes 
272–287 and accompanying text (refuting this claim). 
231 See Harris, 182 F.3d at 803. 
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 Not only is the broader materiality-based approach more consis-
tent with the text of the safe harbor provision as a theoretical matter, 
but such an approach also more accurately reflects the jurisprudence 
that informed the construction of the statute.232 As the Third Circuit 
has recognized, the courts, in applying the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, 
have effectively asserted that cautionary language “negate[s] the mate-
riality of an alleged misrepresentation or omission.”233 In the Second 
Circuit’s 1986 decision in Luce v. Edelstein, for example, the Second Cir-
cuit held that cautionary language is meaningful when it provides no-
tice that the projections might not materialize.234 Similarly, in 1991 in 
Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., the Sixth Circuit determined that the 
cautionary language was sufficient because the “language would alert a 
reasonable investor that [the defendant’s] future was uncertain.”235 By 
asserting that sufficient cautionary language prevents reasonable inves-
tors from unduly relying on uncertain projections, these early cases util-
ized (often implicitly) a materiality-driven approach.236 
 Indeed, the Trump court would later make explicit the implicit ma-
teriality framework that informed these earlier cases.237 Asserting that it 
was following the lead of a number other courts, the Trump court ex-
plicitly held that sufficient cautionary language renders a projection 
immaterial.238 By explicating that the “bespeaks caution” doctrine is 
premised on materiality, the Third Circuit persuasively suggested the 
framework within which the doctrine operates.239 Citing Trump, subse-
quent applications of the “bespeaks caution” doctrine continued to ex-
plicitly define the doctrine in terms of materiality.240 
 As the safe harbor’s construction and context suggest, the provi-
sion must be viewed as operating within a materiality framework.241 
                                                                                                                      
232 See S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 16–17 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 
(quoting extensively from the Third Circuit’s decision in Trump, 7 F.3d 357); Trump, 7 F.3d 
at 371. 
233 Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. 
234 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986). 
235 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991). 
236 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371; Sinay, 948 F.2d at 1040; Luce, 929 F.2d at 56. 
237 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371 (holding that cautionary language renders alleged misrep-
resentations immaterial). 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See, e.g., Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399, 400 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that cautionary language renders predictive statements immaterial); Rubenstein v. 
Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166–67, 167 n.24 (5th Cir. 1994). 
241 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371 (asserting that the “bespeaks caution” doctrine is premised 
on materiality). 
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Such an approach comports better with both the text of the provision 
and the “bespeaks caution” jurisprudence that informed its construc-
tion.242 Indeed, viewed together, these factors effectively demand a dis-
junctive reading of the safe harbor provision.243 
B. The Language and Legislative History of the Safe Harbor Provision  
Require a Disjunctive Reading 
 The language of the safe harbor provision reinforces the disjunc-
tive approach that results from conceptualizing the provision as operat-
ing within a materiality framework.244 The PSLRA’s safe harbor explic-
itly states the two prongs disjunctively, ostensibly protecting either 
statements accompanied by cautionary language or statements made 
without actual knowledge of their falsity.245 A plain meaning analysis of 
the safe harbor thus inevitably results in a disjunctive reading of the 
provision.246 Alternatively, if primacy is given to the safe harbor provi-
sion’s legislative history rather than its text, the provision still demands 
disjunctive treatment because the Conference Committee Report 
clearly evinces such an understanding of the statute.247 Viewed in any 
light, the safe harbor provision must therefore be read as immunizing 
either projections accompanied by meaningful cautionary language, or 
projections made without actual knowledge of their falsity.248 
 In the context of securities litigations, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
articulated an interpretive preference for the plain meaning of a stat-
ute’s language and has downplayed the import of the statute’s legisla-
tive history.249 If a statute’s text presents no ambiguities and resolves the 
contested issue, the Court has deemed an inquiry into the statute’s leg-
                                                                                                                      
242 See id. (articulating the materiality-based approach). Compare In re XM Satellite Ra-
dio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 177 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that, under a 
materiality-based approach, an examination of the first prong requires no inquiry into the 
issuer’s state of mind), with Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (holding that, under a falsity-
based approach, an examination of the first prong of the safe harbor typically includes an 
analysis of the issuer’s state of mind). 
243 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006). 
244 See id. For the full text of the safe harbor provision, see supra note 104. 
245 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1). 
246 See id.; Spencer, supra note 130, at 118. 
247 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 44 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 730 (noting that the actual knowledge prong constitutes an alternative analysis). 
248 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 44. 
249 See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
178, 185 (1994) (“‘[W]e have observed on more than one occasion that the interpretation 
given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little 
assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute.’”). 
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islative history unnecessary and its fruits irrelevant.250 For misleading 
forward-looking statements, the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision ex-
pressly exculpates such projections if they are either identified as for-
ward-looking and “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements 
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ 
materially,” or the plaintiff fails to prove that the statement “was made 
with actual knowledge . . . that the statement was false or misleading.”251 
Under a plain meaning approach, the disjunctive “or” between the two 
clauses suggests that the cautionary language and actual knowledge 
prongs operate as independent, alternative means of immunizing a 
misleading projection.252 
 Although the plain meaning of the safe harbor provision clearly 
supports a disjunctive interpretation, the U.S. Supreme Court has dem-
onstrated a willingness to look beyond statutory language if the lan-
guage is facially absurd or unclear.253 The two prongs of the safe harbor 
provision, however, present no such ambiguities.254 The actual knowl-
edge prong, by exculpating unknowingly false projections, proves ex-
ceedingly clear.255 Moreover, the cautionary language prong’s use of the 
words “meaningful” and “important,” though admittedly less straight-
forward, is not inherently absurd or unclear.256 
 Rather, common dictionary definitions of these terms provide co-
herent meanings that prove consistent with the general tenor of the 
safe harbor provision.257 The term “meaningful” indicates that, to be 
sufficient, cautionary language must “hav[e] . . . meaning or pur-
pose.”258 As such, the term accords with the materiality framework of 
the safe harbor provision, which suggests that cautionary language, to 
be sufficient, must prevent the reasonable investor from relying on a 
misleading projection.259 Indeed, if cautionary language is to prevent a 
                                                                                                                      
250 See id. 
251 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1). 
252 See Spencer, supra note 130, at 118. 
253 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hyper-
textualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. 
Rev. 749, 750 (1995) (noting the Court’s adoption of this textualist approach). 
254 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1). 
255 See id. 
256 See id. 
257 See id. 
258 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 736 (9th ed. 1985). 
259 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371 (holding that cautionary language is sufficient if it prevents 
the reasonable investor from relying on the allegedly misleading projection); Sinay, 948 
F.2d at 1040 (same). 
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reasonable investor from relying on a misleading projection, the cau-
tionary language must have significant meaning for the investor.260 
Moreover, the term “important,” which indicates that the factors identi-
fied by the meaningful cautionary language must be “marked by or in-
dicative of significant worth or consequence,”261 proves similarly consis-
tent with the general tone of the safe harbor provision. Indeed, for 
cautionary language to render a projection immaterial, it must identify 
factors that are of such consequence as to determinatively influence the 
reasonable investor’s decision-making process.262 Accordingly, because 
the language of the safe harbor provision clearly addresses the possibil-
ity of knowingly false projections, the provision’s plainly disjunctive lan-
guage must prevail.263 
 Alternatively, if courts relied on the safe harbor provision’s legisla-
tive history instead of its plain meaning, the same disjunctive reading of 
the provision would result.264 The Conference Committee Report in 
the House of Representatives clearly suggests that cautionary language 
and lack of actual knowledge serve as independent, alternative means 
of inoculating a misleading projection.265 Furthermore, in sharp con-
trast to the reasoning of the conjunctive cases, the Report clearly asserts 
that, under the first prong, courts should disregard the state of mind of 
the issuer and instead focus solely on the cautionary language that ac-
companied the projection.266 Moreover, the policy to protect issuers 
from abusive fraud claims, which was pronounced by the Conference 
Committee in support of the safe harbor provision, accords better with 
the broad, disjunctive reading of the majority courts than with the nar-
row, conjunctive reading of the minority courts.267 
 The safe harbor provision thus demands disjunctive treatment.268 
Because the safe harbor provision clearly addresses the possibility of 
knowingly false projections, effect must be given to the provision’s dis-
                                                                                                                      
260 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371; Sinay, 948 F.2d at 1040. 
261 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, supra note 258, at 605. 
262 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. 
263 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006); Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 178, 185 (hold-
ing that the plain meaning of a statute governs its interpretation). 
264 See H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 44 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 730. 
265 See id. (“The [actual knowledge] prong of the safe harbor provides an alternative 
analysis.”). 
266 See id. (“The first prong of the safe harbor requires courts to examine only the cau-
tionary statement accompanying the forward-looking statement. Courts should not exam-
ine the state of mind of the person making the statement.”). 
267 See id. at 32. 
268 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 32, 44. 
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junctive nature under a plain meaning analysis.269 Alternatively, if the 
provision’s legislative history is examined, the Conference Committee 
Report unmistakably asserts that the two clauses should operate inde-
pendently.270 Accordingly, the language and legislative history of the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor provision demand that its two prongs be read as 
alternative means of immunizing a projection.271 
C. Overcoming the Claim that the Safe Harbor Provides a License to Lie 
 When examined separately, the two clauses of the safe harbor pro-
vision clearly and coherently act as independent means of exculpating 
misleading projections.272 Proponents of a conjunctive reading of the 
provision argue, however, that, examined together, the two clauses ef-
fectively grant issuers a license to lie.273 That is, because the safe harbor 
protects issuers who knowingly make misleading projections as long as 
the projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary language, it 
is argued that the provision allows issuers to mislead investors with im-
punity.274 This argument, however, ignores the policy concerns that 
animate the safe harbor provision.275 It also overstates the dispensation 
that the provision actually grants to issuers.276 As a result, disregarding 
the language of the safe harbor provision to avoid providing issuers 
with a license to lie unnecessarily circumvents the plain meaning of the 
provision.277 
 A disjunctive interpretation of the safe harbor provision furthers 
the policies that animate the PSLRA; under such an interpretation, is-
suers can issue forward-looking information liberally because they are 
able to defeat meritless fraud claims at the early stages of litigation (and 
thereby thwart plaintiffs’ attempts to use the prospect of an expensive 
discovery process to leverage undeserved settlements).278 In contrast, a 
                                                                                                                      
269 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 178, 185. 
270 See H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 44. 
271 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 32, 44. 
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273 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (asserting that the materiality-based approach 
provides issuers with a license to lie); Beck, supra note 43, at 200 (same). 
274 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 73. 
275 See H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 32. 
276 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); Harris, 182 F.3d at 807 (stating that cautionary lan-
guage is only sufficient if it puts investors on notice of the dangers of the investment so 
that they can make an informed decision). 
277 See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 178, 185. 
278 See H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 32, 44. By immunizing all forward-looking statements 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language, the safe harbor provision allows the 
courts to conduct a first prong inquiry simply by referencing the challenged projections 
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conjunctive interpretation of the safe harbor provision undermines the 
PSLRA’s policy concerns: by requiring proof of state of mind under 
both prongs, it prevents issuers from resolving meritless fraud claims at 
an early stage.279 A disjunctive interpretation of the provision more ca-
pably addresses the policy concerns underlying the PSLRA by encour-
aging the dissemination of forward-looking information and discourag-
ing meritless fraud claims.280 
 Moreover, viewed in a materiality framework, a disjunctive reading 
of the safe harbor provision simply does not grant issuers an unre-
stricted license to make false statements to investors.281 The safe harbor 
does immunize issuers who knowingly make false projections, but only 
if, given the cautionary language, a reasonable investor would not have 
been influenced by the misleading projection.282 Thus, issuers may be 
granted a license to lie, but, by preventing issuers from unduly influ-
encing investors, the PSLRA effectively strips issuers of any reason to 
exercise this license.283 Moreover, according to Congress, as investors 
begin to associate deceitful behavior with certain issuers and avoid 
those issuers, “market discipline” will further discourage such behavior 
by effectively increasing the cost of raising capital.284 
 That a literal, disjunctive reading of the safe harbor provision does 
sometimes inoculate issuers who knowingly disclose false projections, 
does not, therefore, prove fatal to a disjunctive reading of the provi-
sion.285 Indeed, a disjunctive reading of the provision, properly viewed 
in a materiality framework, strips issuers of any incentive to manipulate 
investors by conditioning the protection of the issuer on the immateri-
                                                                                                                      
(as opposed to requiring additional discovery). See id. at 44. As such, the provision empow-
ers courts to resolve clearly meritless claims at an early stage of litigation. See id. 
279 See id. at 32. Because proof of state of mind almost always requires evidence not 
readily available to plaintiffs, a conjunctive approach necessitates discovery and thus effec-
tively prevents courts from resolving meritless claims at an early stage of litigation. See Al-
exander, supra note 11, at 527. 
280 See H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 32. 
281 See Trump, 7 F.3d at 371 (holding that, to be sufficient, the cautionary language 
must prevent the reasonable investor from relying on the misleading projection). 
282 See Harris, 182 F.3d at 807; Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. 
283 See Harris, 182 F.3d at 807; Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. If an issuer’s cautionary language 
must be capable of preventing the reasonable investor from relying on the false projection, 
the issuer lacks any motivation to attempt to manipulate investors by making knowingly 
false projections. Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. 
284 See S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (recog-
nizing the license to lie problem, but summarily dismissing it). 
285 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006); Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 178, 185 (hold-
ing that, when a statute addresses a given issue, the statute’s plain meaning should pre-
vail). 
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ality of the false projection.286 As such, although a disjunctive reading of 
the safe harbor does occasionally immunize knowingly false projec-
tions, this result hardly requires courts to disregard the plain meaning 
of the statute.287 
Conclusion 
 Structural features of the legal system have effectively allowed 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to hold corporations hostage by bringing frivolous 
class action securities litigations. In concluding that both prongs of the 
safe harbor provision contain a state of mind element, too many courts 
have interpreted the provision in a way that undermines a primary ob-
jective of the PSLRA, namely facilitating early-stage resolution of merit-
less claims. If, however, the provision is viewed as operating within a 
materiality framework in accordance with the statute’s common-law 
precursor and legislative history, the policies underlying the PSLRA are 
ably achieved. Moreover, viewing the safe harbor in this conceptual 
framework gives effect both to the statute’s plain language and the 
clear intent of Congress. Although critics claim that reading the statute 
disjunctively effectively grants issuers a license to lie, a materiality-based 
approach to the provision disincentivizes such behavior. Accordingly, to 
forestall the threat of continued class action securities abuses by ensur-
ing that the two prongs of the safe harbor provision act as alternative 
means of immunizing a projection, the courts must adopt a materiality-
driven approach to the provision. 
Richard F. Conklin 
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